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p 
Joseph Vining 
subject I have been asked to address is the impact of 
China's WTO [World Trade Organization] accession on 
"the question of corporate responsibility."We might begin by 
asking why corporate responsibility should ever be a question 
at all. 
We do not ask such a question about you or me. You might 
say of me that I'm not a responsible person, or I'm being 
irresponsible in the circumstances, but your assumption is 
that I should be responsible or try to be. You and I look out 
for and care about the consequences of our actions. There is 
tort law out there with its threat of damages, and we pay 
premiums for insurance against liability, for being held 
"responsible" for what happens to someone else. But that is 
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not the reason why we are careful if we are responsible 
people. We actually don't want someone else to be hurt, and 
if we really don't care, and really are indifferent to the 
consequences of our actions, we are viewed as a bit of a 
psychiatric case and a threat - certainly not someone who 
can be dealt with in ordinary affairs. 
But "business," it is urged, is different, and that is why 
corporate responsibility is something that has to be argued 
about and is often pictured as an interference in business, an 
imposition on it and on its central institution, the business 
corporation. I should quickly say that the legal profession, or 
the legal business if you will, also wants to be set apart as not 
responsible for consequences of its actions, despite Justice 
Brandeis' oft-quoted remark that the lawyer's pen does more 
harm than the burglar's tool. Our, lawyers', claim is that we 
do not have to be concerned about the consequences of what 
we do. Our clients may, and our clients' other agents may, 
but we do not. This is a pulling of what lawyers do under the 
umbrella of immunity that applied from ancient times to the 
lawyer in adversary litigation, who was in a form of war. And 
we might note, speaking of war, that the military, as a 
profession and a field of human endeavor, wants to be exempt 
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from the ordinary criminal law, indeed from 
the ordinary law governing human 
experimentation. I think of what has come to 
light in the United States about radiation or 
biological weapons experiments on soldiers, 
or vaccines in the GulfWar. And institutional 
science, too, if you come to think about it. 
What would be assault, or homicide, or 
criminal cruelty to animals, is not, it is 
claimed, if it is done by a scientist engaged in 
scientific research following the rules of 
research. These exemptions, parallel to the 
exemptions sometimes claimed for business, 
are matters of lively debate now in the 
United States and internationally. Actually, so 
is the lawyer's claim that the lawyer is not his 
brother's keeper a matter of increasing 
debate. So this I think is what we are talking 
about when we say that corporate 
responsibility is a debatable question worth 
having a discussion about - exemption and 
difference from the norm. There is 
necessarily the implication of the alternative, 
< \ 
corporate non-responsibility or, some would like to say, 
irresponsibility. 
What are the issues? It used to be thought that the context 
for talking about corporate responsibility was charitable 
contributions. There was famous litigation over contributions 
by business corporations from corporate funds to, for 
example, Princeton, arguing this was using the shareholders' 
money, wasting it, taking it from them since the corporation 
was receiving nothing back. But corporate charitable 
contributions were everywhere upheld, partly on the ground 
that if they were not too large they could be viewed as public 
relations moves, as appearing to be a good citizen, but equally 
on the ground that a corporation was a citizen, that regardless 
of its particular circumstances it had a stake in the country, 
the social fabric, the arts, the relief of poverty. And we all 
know that business corporations now are major patrons. A 
refusal to take Philip Morris' grants, on moral grounds 
relating to smoking, meant a substantial loss for Canadian arts 
organizations. 
But charity is not where the question of corporate 
responsibility really bites, or becomes what our topic calls a 
"China question."The question really bites at the deepest level 
of everyday business decision making. The question is 
presented over and over and over again, and presented also to 
lawyers advising corporate decision makers - what is the 
attitude to take toward the consequences of a business 
decision and the action that follows it? In discussion this often 
becomes a question of attitude toward identifiable groups in 
China and America and beyond on whom the consequences 
fall: workers, retirees, long-term middle management, 
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customers, suppliers, creditors, local and 
national communities, even committed long­
term equity investors. In economic theory 
these effects are called "externalities" but 
that assumes an answer to the question [of) 
what is internal and what is external to a 
business corporation, an answer that 
economics itself cannot give and only the 
law can provide. 
Is one's attitude to be that one attends to 
adverse consequences or attends to these 
groups only insofar as one is forced to, and 
one uses one's ingenuity and imagination to 
avoid doing even that? 
Or is one's attitude to be that one takes 
into account, for their own sake, these 
interests or the values these interests 
represent? If one does attend to them as 
values that are in some sense one's own and 
not merely someone else's, imagination is 
fired, as it always is by what one holds dear, 
to find new ways and more efficient ways of 
realizing them or reducing hurt to them. 
Corporate leaders sometimes say their company is like a 
family, and the example of the head of a family trying to take 
into account the various interests of its various members, 
while keeping an eye on the growth and prosperity of the 
whole, is as good an example as any, and a contrast to the 
opposite attitude, a military general's for example, for whom 
the enemy's interests have no weight at all, and appear in his 
thought only as costs his organization would be forced to bear 
and would seek to minimize. The question is whether the 
corporate attitude, the duty really, conceived and mandated 
by business law, is to be like the general's, or like that of the 
family head. Realistically, I think the alternative possibilities 
are the general, on the one hand, and on the other, something 
on a range between the general and the family head. 
Let me give some examples of actual cases. 
• The Ford Motor Company is designing a car, and it 
appears that the gas tank is so situated and attached that 
there is a high likelihood of explosions and fires in 
relatively mild rear-end collisions. At Ford, what is your 
attitude and reaction to be? Is it to work at the 
governmental level for the theoretical calculation of a low 
dollar figure for the value of a human life, use that figure 
in a static cost-benefit equation, and decide that the cost in 
human lives lost to fiery deaths and any damages Ford 
might be required to pay is less than the gain that could be 
obtained by going ahead with the design as it is? Or do you 
internalize the value of human life, and work with it as 
such in your decision? This has to do with customers. 
• The Chisso Chemical Company in Japan notices that 
fishermen's families around the Bay of Minamata where its 
plant is located are giving birth to horribly deformed 
children. A company scientist samples the 
plant's chemical discharge into the bay and 
discovers that his laboratory animals fed it 
show all the signs of mercury poisoning. At 
Chisso, what is your attitude to be? The 
discharge satisfies the environmental 
standards then in effect. Your wastewater is 
cleaner than the wastewater of your 
competitors. In making decisions on what 
to do on behalf of the corporation, do you 
follow up this suspicion and warning, or do 
you stop the company scientist's 
investigations and leave it to others to be 
concerned about the rising number of 
deformed babies? This question has to do 
with the environment and the local 
community. 
• A Chicago company called Film Recovery 
Systems extracts silver from used 
photographic film by dissolving it in vats of 
cyanide solution. The question arises 
whether to spend money on ventilation 
equipment for the cyanide vats and 
whether to provide training, impermeable gloves, and 
goggles for the non-union immigrant labor steadily 
available and anxious to have jobs in the plant. Profits 
would be higher if these costs were not incurred - safety 
inspectors tell you that ventilation and safety equipment 
are inadequate, but inspections are few and the penalties 
are light for not observing safety regulations. Public 
relations problems are not an issue for you. In making 
these daily decisions on equipment purchases, do you take 
the value of human health itself into account? This has to 
do with workers and their interests. 
• The Dow Chemical Company in my own state of Michigan 
made napalm under contract with the Department of 
Defense, and in the Vietnam War the dropping of napalm 
was injuring civilians and especially children. A group of 
shareholders seeks to raise at the shareholder meeting the 
question whether the company should continue to 
manufacture napalm. In response, and in making decisions 
on behalf of the company, do you seek to prevent 
discussion of the issue on the ground that the concern 
motivating the shareholders is not a concern for profit? Or 
do you let the discussion go forward and lead where it 
may? Then this contract for napalm with the Defense 
Department becomes unprofitable in part by its own 
terms and in part because of adverse publicity from 
napalm affecting the recruitment of good chemical 
engineers from engineering schools. Do you go forward 
with the manufacture of napalm anyway because of your 
commitment to the national interest? These questions have 
to do with humanity in general and patriotic duty. 
In each of these decisional problems 
which eventually came to a court, there 
were arguments made that the values 
involved were of no concern to the business 
decision making of the corporation, and that 
the groups affected - workers, customers, 
residents, the nation - ought to look out 
for themselves, and I emphasize the word 
"ought" or "should" because, remember, this 
was argument about the way corporations 
ought to make their decisions and an 
argument about what those affected by the 
consequences legitimately ought to expect. 
The question was corporate responsibility, 
put in operational terms. 
I think of the way the question has been 
raised frequently in the Enron case we are in 
the midst of in the United States. California, 
as you know, recently suffered power 
blackouts, about which a good many non­
Californians were not so terribly unhappy. 
But it has been discovered that Enron 
traders were using schemes named Fat Boy, 
Death Star, Richochet, and Get Shorty, to profit hugely from 
manipulation of the rules desperately put into place in 
response to the blackouts. An internal Enron memo noted 
that the strategy "appears not to present any problems, other 
than a public relations risk," arising from the fact that "it may 
have contributed to California's declaration of a Stage 2 
Emergency yesterday."The public relations risks were 
something to be costed out, but the Stage 2 Emergency was 
not Enron's concern. On the other hand, the very fact that 
Enron's decisions ran a public relations risk and that the 
memo was not one they wanted anyone to see points to the 
problem of corporate responsibility. There would be no 
public relations risk if this were what it was agreed business 
corporations should do. 
We do not know what the outcome will be at Enron, 
whether the verdict of the market will be the only verdict. I 
can say what happened in the other cases involving 
customers, workers, and other groups. Some of you may 
know these cases. In the Ford case, Ford did the cost-benefit 
analysis and went ahead with the gas tank unchanged. The 
corporation itself was indicted for manslaughter in the deaths 
of customers who bought a Pinto and were burnt to death. 
Ford's cost-benefit calculation in the circumstances was 
relevant to its criminal intent, which was, for purposes of 
manslaughter, "indifference to the value of human life."There 
was no resolution of the case at trial because of evidentiary 
problems with regard to the particular Pinto involved. A 
good many books appeared about the case with titles like 
Reckless Homicide, and it became a staple in professional 
studies of organizational behavior. 
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In the Japanese case, with regard to what came later to be 
known as Minimata disease, Chisso stopped its scientist's 
investigations. The deformities were eventually linked to 
Chisso, and the victims sued. The Japanese court ruled that 
"the defendant's plant discharged acetaldehyde wastewater 
with negligence at all times, and even though the quality and 
content of the wastewater of the defendant's plants satisfied 
statutory limitations and administrative standards, and even if 
the treatment methods it employed were superior to those 
taken at the work yards of other companies in the same 
industry, these are not enough .... No plant can be 
permitted to infringe on and run at the sacrifice of the lives 
and health of the regional residents." Over time Chisso paid 
out indemnity of tens of millions of dollars. 
In the case of the silver recovery company in Chicago, 
workers sickened and were blinded from cyanide, and one 
died. The company itself was prosecuted under the general 
criminal law and convicted of negligent homicide, and the 
company's officials were convicted of murder, convictions 
that were eventually reduced to manslaughter. 
In the Dow Chemical case, in which I was the 
shareholders' counsel for a time, management lost its 
argument in federal court that concerns other than profit had 
no place in discussion at a shareholder meeting, though it was 
supported by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The 
shareholder proposal with respect to napalm was defeated, 
the management inconsistently introducing the national 
interest into the argument. Eventually Dow ceased 
manufacturing napalm. 
These of course are examples that have become public. 
Questions whether values are going to be taken into account 
for their own sake and whether corporate managers are to 
think themselves in any way responsible for the consequences 
of the decisions they make arise in myriad milder ways every 
day. 
Some of these example cases involve the criminal law, and 
I should emphasize how much that has entered the debate 
over corporate responsibility in the United States in the last 
15 years, really since the Reagan revolution reduced 
administrative regulation and it simultaneously became clear 
that in any case the regulated could often effectively "capture" 
the regulators. The general criminal law in the United States, 
the common law of crime, is now directed at corporations 
themselves as persons and supplements specific provisions 
directed at corporations as such. As you know, the accounting 
firm [Arthur] Andersen was recently indicted and convicted. 
There was much surprise that only one Andersen partner was 
indicted individually; in fact this is a common pattern. 
But there is opposition to the application of the criminal 
law to corporations, not just because they are corporations 
and not individuals, but because they are business 
corporations. It surfaced with force in 2000 in the 
widespread debate over the Ford-Firestone vehicle rollover 
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problem, which ended with Congress introducing criminal 
sanctions into auto safety regulation, one of the few 
remaining regulatory fields where there had been only civil 
fines. Of interest to us here is the distinctive feature of 
criminal law, that the values it protects, life, safety, 
environmental integrity, and competitive markets, are to be 
internalized. You are generally not convicted for breaking a 
rule: the very rule is that you are not to be indifferent to the 
value. You cannot define criminal homicide, for instance, in 
any more definite way than a showing of indifference to the 
value of human life. 
This reaches deep into business decision making. Even if 
there is a quite specific administrative rule forbidding on pain 
of criminal sanction the trucking of explosives through New 
York's tunnels, it is standard law that a trucking company may 
be convicted for such trucking of explosives though it does 
not know about the rule. "Ignorance of the law is no defense" 
is the awkward way it is put, awkward because a sane 
defendant is not thought to be ignorant of what counts in 
criminal law. It's not a "rule" that limits your choice of routes, 
it's a value. The criminal mind, the mental element that 
makes such trucking a crime, is precisely indifference to the 
possibility of explosion in the tunnel, not indifference to 
"rule-breaking." 
What will develop in China in this respect will depend 
upon the nature and processes of Chinese criminal law, and 
one can imagine some period of contraction in its 
application. The expanding application of the criminal law in 
a business setting in the United States produces continuing, 
strong opposition. But I think we can see that what is really 
being argued about is much more general, the nature of the 
decision making within business corporations that we as a 
community want to have, or that we as the world want to 
have now that we are in a globalized business setting. 
The other major development that bears on corporate 
responsibility, other than the recent turn to the criminal law, 
is a new focus on the functioning and responsibility of 
corporate lawyers. Professional ethics, or the law applying to 
lawyers, is sometimes thought of as set apart from questions 
of substantive law, or the law governing what lawyers' clients 
should do, and its remedies as also set apart from the 
remedies of substantive law. But ethics and substantive law 
are not so separate where the corporation is the client and 
the lawyer is counsel to the corporate entity and not to 
particular individuals associated with the entity. 
The fusion occurs in two ways. The corporation can't 
speak for itself. What its interests are has to be decided in 
order to say whether lawyers have fulfilled their duty to it. 
You can't simply ask it directly what its interests are. The 
other fusion of ethics and substance, where the corporation is 
the client, is in the fact that a lawyer is not merely advisor, 
negotiator, and defender, but an actor deeply involved in the 
doing of what corporations do. 
Corporate recent experience in 
the United States reflect& this fusion. 
Government agencies, such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Office ofThrift Supervision overseeing 
banking institutions, have '"''""Jmw• 
authority and can bar from whole 
fields of practice, and have done so, on 
the ground that, given substantive ,.,,,..n.nrc><P 
law, the lawyer has violated his or her 
fiduciary duty to the client, which is 
the entity. Management representatives of 
the entity may be arguing on behalf of the 
accused lawyer, that she did what they told 
her to do, but they too have been deemed to 
be speaking for themselves and not for the 
entity. 
Very large damage awards have been paid 
to bondholders, minority stockholders, and 
government agencies representing the customers of bankrupt 
savings and loan institutions, by law firms that are among our 
best known. When I say large, I mean large. The partners of 
Kaye Scholer in New York were sued for $ 275 million by the 
government on behalf of depositors and settled for $4 1 
million. Jones Day settled for $ 24 million with investors in 
one savings and loan, and settled with the government for 
$5 1 million after facing possible damages of $500 million. 
Paul, Weiss settled for $45 million. Implicit in these rulings 
and settlements is a determination that the interests of the 
business entity include to some degree the interests of these 
groups and the values they represent, bondholders, 
depositors, small shareholders. And - here is the second 
aspect of the blending I mentioned lawyers were held 
personally responsible for losses that were caused (as a matter 
of fact) by their actions and failure to act, where these actions 
could not be protected or defended by a claim that they were 
fulfilling a duty to their client, the entity as a whole. 
This means that the inevitable presence of lawyers, 
inevitable because organizations cannot do without them, acts 
as an independent check on the business decision making 
going on under the corporation's authority and on its behalf. 
Introduce as a client a creature that cannot speak for itself, an 
entity that is not an individual human being, and the most 
interesting things occur, among them that the lawyer herself 
is seen as an actor in the world with responsibility for 
consequences. 
Most recently, just a few months ago, the American Bar 
Association changed its Model Rules of Professional 
Responsibility to provide that a lawyer was authorized to 
reveal client confidences, without the consent of other 
representatives of the client - and here l quote the new rule 
"to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to 
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." 
This change was not effected without a considerable fight; 
f\ 
indeed in there was a 
reconsideration and a reaffirmation of this 
change. the rules 
criminal act and that the 
"imminent." Now there is no 
and the danger of death or 
substantial bodily harm need be 
ca,.v''""-'iY certain. The is not 
a 
required to warn and prevent not 
of 
But he has no longer a defense that his 
responsibility to his client absolves him from 
being concerned about the consequences of 
his silence. In the same way others, 
accountants, even someday engineers 
perhaps, may have no defense that their 
responsibility to the business corporate 
entity absolves them from responsibility for 
consequences. Again, as the corporate bar 
and regulation in China develop along with the 
reorganization of Chinese industry after accession to the 
lawyers and other professionals may begin to have 
something of a similar role in China. 
In the largest view, the "China question" as it relates 
particularly to responsibility seems to me to have 
two parts or sides. 
One concerns the decision making and the constituents of 
the emerging private corporations in the People's Republic 
[of China (PRC)], whose guiding purposes as defined in the 
Company Law of 199 3 and 1999 are not put in terms of 
exclusive profit "maximization." Chinese statutory language is 
not unlike the law's language of business corporate purpose in 
America. English translation of the corporate purpose 
clauses in the People's Republic Company Act contemplates 
operation "with a view to improving economic return." The 
American Law Institute contemplates making corporate 
decisions "with a view to enhancing corporate profit," and this 
parallel language was chosen the Institute after a proposal 
to describe the purpose of an American business corporation 
as "long-term profit maximization" was specifically rejected. 
The PRC Company Act provides further that "in 
conducting its business, a company must . . .  strengthen the 
development of socialist spiritual civilization," again, in my 
English translation. Perhaps someone during discussion will 
say how this reads in Chinese and what alternative translations 
would be. And the Act requires consultation with workers 
before making decisions affecting them, giYing them a status 
somewhat less definite than in European companies where 
workers elect part of the Board of Directors, or even in 
British corporations, where British law instructs directors to 
take into account the interests of the employees in general as 
well as the interests of the shareholders. But, as one might 
in China, the interests of workers are at least 
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introduced explicitly into the decision-making process even if 
are not given specific weight. However enforced or 
enforceable these company law provisions may be at the 
moment, they do define the standard and the shape of the 
present ideaL 
Then there are the state-owned enterprises, which have 
quite definite obligations to a variety of the groups that I 
listed as examples earlier. The question there will be how far 
those responsibilities will be legally modified and whether, 
indeed, competition and rigorous financial accounting will 
make some or many of those obligations impossible. I might 
say that such modifications or shedding would fall far short of 
moving to a position in law or in fact of corporation 
irresponsibility, the mode of thought in which all substantive 
value is external, none is internalized, and all mental activity 
is calculation. 
This, the Chinese side of the question, is matched by the 
question raised for the United States and other Western 
economies by China's looming presence in the business of the 
world. As competition from Chinese industry increases, 
advantaged presumably for some time by lower labor costs, 
market constraints on corporate decision-making processes in 
the United States may increase. I say may increase. We do not 
know how competition is going to play out, what the relative 
advantages are going to be or how large a factor labor costs 
will be. We do know that there has historically almost never 
been a perfect market in the ideal sense of economic theory 
that takes away all discretion. Business decisions will not 
become virtually automatic, with bankruptcy and 
disappearance attending any incorrect decision in the way 
extinction attends any incorrect "decision" of the genes in 
evolutionary competition. We know that the market itself will 
not answer our question. The question of corporate 
responsibility, as a question of real responsibility for the 
consequences of a corporation's actions in the world, will 
remain as far as we can see. 
Nor will it do in the future, in China, America, or the 
world as a whole, to say the responsibility is the customer's 
and the corporation is the slave or tool of the customer, who 
can name a price for the protection of a value and protect it 
by paying the price to a seller who offers to protect it, "vote" 
as it were, put his money where his mouth is. Values do not 
work that way, choices are not presented that way, time does 
not work that way. Around the world we organize and are 
organized in order to live together, and the business 
corporation may already be the major form of human 
organization that surrounds decision making through 
governmental organization. We no more present ourselves 
with a choice whether to respond to and sustain the activities 
of a sociopathic mentality in business, utterly indifferent to 
value, than we present ourselves with the choice whether to 
sustain a sociopathic person at large on the street. "Business" 
is not a set of value-free machines. "Business" is a set of living 
human organizations allowing us as individuals to live in a 
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way we can stand to live - to have lives as individuals we 
can justify to ourselves and each other. 
But we should not forget, in the debate over corporate 
responsibility, that there is no intrinsic conflict between 
markets and competition on the one hand and the protection 
of substantive value on the other. Competition may be 
necessary to keep action and care and attention and energy 
up to the mark when the absence of such care, attention, and 
energy does violence to others. It is tragic, but love and 
concern are not enough, as I think all of us know. Passengers 
burn to death in a train whose emergency doors will not 
open in a crash. The train crash itself is produced in part by 
scheduling breakdowns and chronic delays in starting. All of 
this, including the violent and fiery deaths and unimaginable 
pain and loss that occur, might have been avoided by one or 
another individual going further to check and repair despite 
his fatigue, or taking risks to avoid delay, or worrying about 
scheduling when that was not precisely within her 
instructions. Competition, nagging fear of losing and of 
exclusion from property and employment, may sometimes be 
the only way of avoiding the daily assaults on life and health 
and fair expectation with which corporate responsibility is 
concerned. There can certainly be a lively dispute about 
"ruthless competition," its virtues and its vices, but the truth 
is that competition as such can be in the service of what 
human beings hold most dear. 
